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THE LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MEDICINE OF OFFLABEL PRESCRIBING

William S. Comanor* & Jack Needleman**

Abstract: There is a major dissonance in the current structure of regulating new drugs that
have more than one medical indication. Physicians are authorized to prescribe these drugs for
all indications including those beyond their approved purposes. However, product
manufacturers are expressly prohibited from marketing or promoting their drugs for any
purpose other than those which have been specifically indicated. While prescribing
physicians are encouraged to gain medical information on any additional indications, they
cannot obtain it from one of its most likely sources: the drug’s supplier.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ recent opinion in United States v. Caronia has
challenged this regulatory structure. For the three states in the Second Circuit, although not
the rest of the country, the FDA’s regulations prohibiting promotion of non-approved
indications have been restricted.
In this Article, we review the legal, economic, and medical aspects of the FDA’s current
regulatory approach, and explore the likely consequences of a widespread adoption of the
Caronia rule.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a major dissonance in the current structure of regulating new
drugs that have more than a single medical indication. Physicians are
authorized to prescribe these drugs for all indications including those
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beyond their approved purposes. However, product manufacturers are
expressly prohibited from marketing or promoting their drugs for any
purpose other than those which have been specifically indicated.1 Thus,
while prescribing physicians are encouraged to gain medical information
on any additional indications, the information that physicians can obtain
from the most likely source—the drug’s supplier—is substantially
constrained.2
Although the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) originally
accentuated this dissonance, it has more recently retreated from that
posture; first under pressure from the statutory admonitions of 1997,3
and subsequently due to the Second Circuit’s opinion in United States v.
Caronia.4 However, the issue remains in flux and is the subject of this
Article.
In succeeding Parts, we review the legal, economic, and medical
aspects of this dissonance: between what physicians are authorized to
prescribe and what information drug manufactures are permitted to
provide about their products. A critical feature of this dissonance is its
connection to the two separate types of information about the therapeutic
properties of pharmaceuticals, so we start with a discussion of this
distinction. Finally, we suggest some policy conclusions to be drawn for
this discussion.
I.

PHARMACEUTICAL EFFICACY AND EFFECTIVENESS

The U.S. drug approval process is a multi-stage process involving the
identification of a potential drug and various trials that must be met to
discern its safety and efficacy. The formal approval process requires
manufacturers to submit a New Drug Application (NDA), which the
FDA reviews in its decision-making process on whether to approve a
drug for sale. Critically, drugs are approved only for the specific
indications disclosed in the firm’s NDA.
An essential part of the NDA is its report on the three formal stages of
testing required by the FDA. Phase I, usually conducted on healthy
volunteers, focuses on safety and potential side effects, and may also be
used to understand how the drug is metabolized.5 Phase II examines
1. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2012).
2. See id.
3. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
4. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
5. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/UCM284393.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DGM-BEB6].
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whether the drug appears to be effective for a specific indication, where
the proposed drug is compared to a placebo or another drug.6 Safety and
side effects continue to be assessed in these trials.7 Phase III is a much
larger trial which assesses the efficacy of the drug in different
subpopulations and at different dosages.8 Such trials can vary in their
complexity, but their inferences of efficacy are fundamentally based on
the statistical tests of the differences in outcomes in the patients treated
with the drug and those treated with placebos or alternatives.9 Given the
expense of Phase III trials and the numbers of patients required to assure
that differences in outcomes are unlikely to be the results of sampling
variation between the treated and control groups, the outcomes and
indications studied in these trials are often quite limited.10
At the heart of the ongoing policy debates concerning off-label
prescribing lies the distinction between pharmaceutical “efficacy” and
“effectiveness.” That distinction follows from the different types of
information that can potentially be gleaned on the therapeutic benefits
gained from taking pharmaceuticals. Consider the difference between
the information obtained from a formal clinical trial of a prospective
drug and the information gathered from medical practice and experience
resulting largely from observational studies.
The clinical trials required by the FDA to be included in a company’s
NDA make little use of any substantive knowledge of the drugs being
studied. The judgment that a drug is efficacious or not is based on the
results of a randomized control trial, in which judgments on efficacy are
made by ruling out, via statistical theory, that difference in outcomes
between the treatment and control group are simply due to sampling
variation.11 Randomization is presumed sufficient to balance the
observable and unobservable factors that might influence outcomes.12
And confidence in the results is enhanced by including only a narrow
group of patients with limited variation in key characteristics and by
maintaining high standards for protocol fidelity.13 To a great extent, the

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see also G.R. Davies et al., Adaptive Clinical Trials in Tuberculosis: Applications,
Challenges and Solutions, 19 INT’L J. TUBERCULOSIS & LUNG DISEASE 626 (2015).
10. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 5; Davies et al., supra note 9.
11. Kenneth Stanley, Design of Randomized Controlled Trials, 115 CIRCULATION 1164, 1166
(2007).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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fundamental discipline underlying the trials is not pharmacology but
statistics.
In contrast, assessments of a drug’s effectiveness rely on experience
and medical observation in patient populations.14 Understanding the
mode of action of the underlying active ingredient can be critical in a
clinician’s judgment about whether a particular use is appropriate, and
these judgments are refined by extension to other settings. Note that this
reliance typically requires a clear understanding of the drug’s
pharmacology.
Both methods have their strengths and their weaknesses. The clinical
trials used to demonstrate a drug’s efficacy depend critically on the
sample of patients being tested. Clinical trials strictly pertain only to the
population from which the sample is drawn. If the results are
extrapolated or generalized to apply to populations beyond those
included in the clinical trial, the therapeutic effects found in the clinical
trials may not apply. Furthermore, statistical tests are generally applied
to mean values which can be misleading when the variance of individual
outcomes is large. For drugs which are effective only for a limited
segment of the patient population, moreover, the positive effect on that
segment may be obscured by the drug’s unresponsiveness in the rest of
the population.
In addition, statistical tests require the selection of a particular level of
statistical significance, which in effect defines the trade-off between
Type I and Type II errors.15 Because of the influence of random or
14. To make this concrete, consider the report of the trial of sofosbuvir (sovaldi) for untreated
chronic hepatitis C infection, as reported in the New England Journal of Medicine. Eric Lawitz et
al., Sofosbuvir for Previously Untreated Chronic Hepatitis C Infection, 20 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1878
(2013). The analysis section describing the methods reads in part:
In the NEUTRINO study, we determined that the enrollment of 300 patients with HCV
genotype 1, 4, 5, or 6 infection would provide a power of 90% to show a rate of sustained
virologic response with the sofosbuvir regimen that was higher than 60%, a calculated control
rate based on previous efficacy after adjustment for the presence of cirrhosis and expected
safety benefit.
Id. at 1880. “We used two-sided testing at the 0.05 level in both studies. Multivariable logisticregression analyses characterizing the relationship between a sustained virologic response and
various prespecified demographic and baseline clinical characteristics were performed.” Id. at
1880–81. The results section reads:
A total of 295 of the 327 patients (90%; 95% confidence interval [CI], 87 to 93) with HCV
genotype 1, 4, 5, or 6 had a sustained virologic response 12 weeks after treatment (Table 2).
The two-sided one-sample exact test established the primary efficacy end point of the
superiority of sofosbuvir plus peginterferon–ribavirin, as compared with an adjusted historical
response rate of 60% (P<0.001).
Id. at 1881. Some laboratory results are reported on patients who relapsed after treatment, but this is
a limited part of the trial and not central to the decision to approve the drug. Id. at 1883.
15. A type I error is an incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis (false positive). J.A. Freiman et
al., The Importance of Beta, the Type II Error and Sample Size in the Design and Interpretation of
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individual factors, minimizing the risk of approving an inefficacious
drug means tolerating increased risks of disapproving efficacious drugs.
The need to select among these types of error is an inevitable attribute of
employing statistical methods for drug approval. Moreover, the level of
statistical significance is typically fixed by standard practice without
regard to the potential risks and benefits of a particular drug.
In contrast, relying on observational data has its own problems.
Outcomes invariably depend on the particular patients observed, and one
never knows whether a specific patient is typical or not. In addition,
patients in observational studies are not selected randomly so that
judgments of a drug’s effectiveness may require dealing with substantial
variation among patients along with differences in dosages as well as
between planned and actual use of dosage regimens.16 As a result, the
patient outcomes in observational studies may not represent the typical
response to the drug. The relevant information includes both case reports
and trials noted in the medical literature. These studies rely on an
understanding of medical modes of action so there is more than mere
statistics involved. In determining drug effectiveness, pharmacological
understanding plays a major role.
For new pharmaceuticals, the clinical trial data contained in the NDA
is the only available basis for assessing efficacy. On the other hand, for
drugs already on the market that may have been used extensively by
physicians for non-indicated purposes, the medical literature is a
prominent source of product information. Critically, judgments based on
these different types of information can be quite different. The
discrepancies between a drug’s performance in clinical trials—its
efficacy—and its performance in a larger patient population—its
effectiveness—have been regularly noted in the medical literature.17
the Randomized Control Trial: Survey of 71 “Negative” Trials, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 690, 690
(1978). A type II error is a failure to reject a false null hypothesis (false negative). Id. at 691. In the
case of a prescription drug, a type I error would be drawing a conclusion that the drug has an effect
different from the placebo or other treatment it is being tested against. Id. at 690. A type II error
would be concluding the effect is absent when in the population it is present. Id. at 691. There is a
tradeoff between these types of errors with the degree of the tradeoff and risk of each error a
function of the magnitude of the effectiveness of the drug in the population (compared to placebo or
comparison treatment) and the size of the samples in which the test is conducted. See Milton
Weinstein & Richard Zeckhauser, Critical Ratios and Efficient Allocation, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 147, 154
(1973).
16. Anders Ahlbom, Statistical and Scientific Inference, 276 J. INTERNAL MED. 238 (2014);
Natalie A. DiPietro, Methods in Epidemiology: Observational Study Designs, 30
PHARMACOTHERAPY 973 (2010); Kelly M. Shields et al., Principles of Drug Literature Evaluation
for Observational Study Designs, 31 PHARMACOTHERAPY 115 (2011).
17. See, e.g., Hans-Georg Eichler et al., Bridging the Efficacy-Effectiveness Gap: A Regulator’s
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Assessments of the appropriateness of using a drug based on clinical
trials may well differ from decisions based on experience gained from
off-label monitoring and less controlled, more observational studies.
As off-label uses are reported, drug compendia evaluate the available
evidence and present an assessment of appropriate uses.18 These
compendia are summaries of drug information compiled by a wide range
of non-government parties, drawing upon internal experts and external
reviewers. They include information on drug characteristics,
recommended uses, and dosages. Payers19 use compendia assessments to
determine whether a given use will be reimbursed.20 Potential
reimbursement may also affect physician prescription patterns.21
In some medical specialties, it is common for the professional
association or academy to publish accepted practice guidelines. Thus,
before deciding whether to prescribe a drug for a specific off-label use,
clinicians may reference their own experience, published literature,
compendia or local or professional guidelines, and payer policies toward
reimbursing for specific purposes.22 Over time this information base can
grow, providing new assessments of both the efficacy of a drug as
demonstrated in clinical trials in a limited population and also potentially
the effectiveness of the drug as used in practice across broader patient
populations.23

Perspective on Addressing Variability of Drug Response, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 495
(2011).
18. Loreen Brown, Gain a Solid Understanding of Compendia and Its Impact on Patient Access,
FORMULARY WATCH 252–56 (2012), http://formularyjournal.modernmedicine.com/formularyjournal/news/clinical/clinical-pharmacology/gain-solid-understanding-compendia-and-its-imp
[https://perma.cc/3C26-VN4K].
19. Payers include insurance companies, large corporations, government agencies, such as the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and others who pay pharmacies the larger share of the
pharmaceuticals used by on behalf of insured patients.
20. ROSS MCKINNEY ET AL., DUKE CTR. FOR CLINICAL HEALTH POLICY RES., POTENTIAL
CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PRODUCTION OF DRUG COMPENDIA 5 (2009),
www.amcp.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=9442 [https://perma.cc/F2B3-QQ3V].
21. See generally William H. Shrank et al., A Bitter Pill: Formulary Variability and the
Challenge to Prescribing Physicians, 17 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 401, 401 (2004).
22. See generally N. Ghinea et al., No Evidence or No Alternative? Taking Responsibility for OffLabel Prescribing, 42 J. INTERNAL MED. 247 (2012); Emily A. Largent et al., Going Off-Label
Without Venturing Off-Course: Evidence and Ethical Off-Label Prescribing, 169 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1745 (2009).
23. Brian R. Flay, Efficacy and Effectiveness Trials (and Other Phases of Research) in the
Development of Health Promotion Programs, 15 PREVENTIVE MED. 451 (1986); Russell E.
Glasgow et al., Why Don’t We See More Translation of Health Promotion Research to Practice?
Rethinking the Efficacy-to-Effectiveness Transition, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1261 (2003).
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THE LAW AND REGULATION OF PRODUCT LABELING

Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),24 the FDA is
authorized to regulate and control pharmaceutical labeling,25 and it is
this authority that serves as the basis for the agency’s post-market
regulation. Once the FDA has approved a pharmaceutical for sale, it
cedes substantial control over the drug to the approved manufacturer,
who is then free to price and distribute the product largely as it wants.
However, the FDA retains control over product labeling.26
For decades, the FDA has required that the drug labels of approved
drugs follow the format contained in its “Uniform Labeling
Requirements.”27 Among the subjects to be included in a drug’s label are
its “indications and usage;” information which is derived directly from
the seller’s approved NDA.28 Furthermore, as one writer noted, “the
emergent irony of prescription drug labeling . . . is that it increasingly
depends upon pre-market decision-making rather than post-market
surveillance.”29 In large measure, the decisions a pharmaceutical
company makes in the pre-licensure period regarding which indications
and endpoints are the focus of its clinical trials determine the approved
labeled indications and usage. Strikingly, the drug’s history in use has
only a minimal effect on product labeling, which instead depends largely
on the trials reported in the drug’s NDA that were completed before the
product was authorized for sale.30
The FDA’s authority over pharmaceutical labeling could potentially
be exercised over both physicians and manufacturers. However, the
FDA has recognized that its authority diminishes once new drugs are
approved.31 Whether for political or medical reasons, the agency has
traditionally considered regulating the prescribing decisions of
physicians as beyond its mandate. Its guidance to physicians on this
issue reads: “[i]f physicians use a product for an indication not in the
approved labeling, they have the responsibility to be well informed
24. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399(f) (2012). The FDCA was
signed in 1938 by President Roosevelt. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No.
75-717, 52 Stat. 1040.
25. DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 114, 116 (2010).
26. Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 30 (D.D.C. 1995).
27. CARPENTER, supra note 25, at 614–15.
28. Id. at 615.
29. Id. at 615–16.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 608–09.
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about the product, to base its use on firm scientific rationale and on
sound medical evidence, and to maintain records of the product’s use
and effects.”32
This regulatory posture has accompanied widespread off-label
prescribing and use. While there are no definitive values for the
proportion of prescriptions written off-label, estimates range from
twenty-one to sixty percent of all prescriptions.33 There are three types
of off-label use: prescription of the drug for patients for whom it has not
been approved, especially children; application at doses or through
modes of administration that have not been approved; and prescription
for conditions for which the drug has not been approved.
Among the more common off-label uses for drugs are for the
treatment of children, and those directed at psychiatric and neurological
disorders, and cancer. The extent of off-label use in children has been
widely studied in both inpatient and outpatient settings. In a 2005 review
of thirty studies on off-label drug use in children, the authors reported
that off-label prescribing varied from eleven to eighty percent.34 Rates
were higher for inpatients than outpatients, and higher for younger
children. In neonatal units, rates of off-label prescribing ranged from
fifty-five to eighty percent, while in other hospital units, off-label
prescribing ranged from sixteen to sixty-two percent.35 On the other
hand, in outpatient and community hospital settings, the reported rate of
off-label prescribing ranged from eleven to thirty-seven percent.36 A
2009 study using the U.S. National Ambulatory Care Medical Survey
found that sixty-two percent of outpatient pediatric visits included offlabel prescribing.37
No comparable studies exist for psychiatric care, but there are some
reports of the use of antipsychotic agents, which find rates of off-label
prescribing between fifteen and sixty-six percent.38 In a review of off-

32. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFF-LABEL AND INVESTIGATIONAL USE OF MARKETED DRUGS,
BIOLOGICS, AND MEDICAL DEVICES – INFORMATION SHEET (2014).
33. James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use and Informed Consent: Debunking
Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 80 (1998); David C. Radley et al., Off-Label
Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1024 (2006).
34. Chiara Pandolfini & Maurizio Bonati, A Literature Review on Off-Label Drug Use in
Children, 164 EUR. J. PEDIATRICS 552, 552 (2004).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Alicia T.F. Bazzano et al., Off-Label Prescribing to Children in the United States Outpatient
Setting, 9 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 81, 83 (2009).
38. Corrado Barbui et al., Off-Label and Non-Classical Prescriptions of Antipsychotic Agents in
Ordinary In-Patient Practice, 109 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 275, 277 (2004); Stephen
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label drug use among cancer specialists, the General Accounting Office
found in 1989 that one-third of the drugs prescribed were used offlabel.39 Furthermore, more than half of all cancer patients are prescribed
with a drug off-label.40
Overall, off-label drug use is a common component of medical care.
As Beck and Azari conclude:
The bare fact of off-label use of a device or drug carries with it
no medical information, either express or implied. While
patients might have some assurance that uses actually appearing
on a label are safe and effective, they cannot imply from a
label’s silence that a particular use recommended by their
physician is unsafe, risky, novel or untried.41
The extensive use of pharmaceuticals off-label could raise the legal
issue of whether physicians need to obtain the informed consent of their
patients when prescribing a drug for an off-label use. Currently,
physicians are required to provide their patients with certain relevant
information. This includes the nature of the ailment, a description of the
proposed treatment and alternatives, the probability of success for the
proposed therapy and alternatives, and the risks to the patient.42
However, patients do not need to be informed that a prescribed drug is
being used in an off-label manner, but only if a new use is being
formally tested as part of a research protocol.43
Overall, we observe that pharmaceuticals are frequently used for nonapproved or off-label indications, and also that such use carries no
medical information. Off-label use is a common form of medical
practice in many specialties44 and as the FDA does not assume
supervisory control over the practice, nor does it proscribe such use.45
This feature of pharmaceutical usage sets the framework for the recent
spate of FDA regulations and legal decisions.

Kogut et al., Prescribing of Antipsychotic Medication in a Medicaid Population: Use of Polytherapy
and Off-Label Dosages, 11 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 17 (2005); Elisabeth Weiss et al., OffLabel Use of Antipsychotic Drugs, 20 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 695 (2000).
39. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: IMPLICATIONS OF DRUG LABELING
AND OFF-LABEL USE: STATEMENT OF SARAH F. JAGGER 2–3 (1996).
40. Id. at 3.
41. Beck & Azari, supra note 33, at 89.
42. Largent et al., supra note 22, at 1746.
43. Beck & Azari, supra note 33, at 85.
44. See supra notes 33–40 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
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III.

THE LAW AND REGULATION OF ADVERTISING AND
PROMOTION

In contrast to the FDA’s restrained approach toward physician
prescribing of pharmaceuticals, the agency has taken a strong stand
against off-label promotional activities. When off-label prescribing first
became an important issue in the 1980s, then Commissioner David
Kessler specifically decided that the FDA’s response would be directed
at drug companies rather than prescribers and that the agency’s efforts
would be aimed principally at discouraging unauthorized promotional
efforts.46 The FDA originally took the position that any claim that a drug
could be “safe and effective” for an off-label use was always “false or
misleading,” although more recently it retreated from that strong
position.47 Notably, it was Kessler’s decision that led to the FDA’s
current regulatory posture to acknowledge and accept off-label sales of
pharmaceuticals while at the same time prohibiting all efforts by
suppliers to provide any information, whether through advertising or
representatives, on how their products should be used.
To be sure, the FDA has created a pathway through which additional
indications could be approved, added to the drug’s label, and then
promoted. Companies can file Supplemental New Drug Applications
(sNDAs) following an earlier approval for the purpose of adding
additional indications. Between 2000 and 2006, there were 294 sNDAs
filed for this purpose, although that number was only about two percent
of the nearly 14,000 sNDAs filed for all purposes during the same
years.48 Whatever the advantages associated with adding additional
indications to the drug’s label, they were apparently exceeded in most
cases by the costs and risks involved.
With this pathway largely blocked by economic if not regulatory
factors, manufacturers faced the question of what practices to follow in
marketing their drugs. A critical question was whether they could legally
provide any information to physicians on non-indicated uses of their
drugs. Prior to the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, the FDA answer
was no.49 However, FDA restrictions came under sharp attack from the
American Medical Association (AMA) in the 1990s, with AMA
representatives calling for the FDA to permit physicians more access to
46. CARPENTER, supra note 25, at 619.
47. Id. at 618, 620–21; see also Jerry Avorn et al., Forbidden and Permitted Statements about
Medications — Loosening the Rules, 373 N. ENG. J. MED. 967 (2015).
48. CARPENTER, supra note 25, at 613.
49. Avorn et al., supra note 47, at 967–68.
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information on off-label uses by allowing manufacturers to distribute
scientific studies about such uses.50 Congress responded with the
Modernization Act of 1997, which authorized manufacturers to
distribute unabridged peer reviewed publications or reference materials
to health care practitioners, pharmacy benefit managers, health insurers,
group health plans, and federal and state governments.51 In its
implementation of the new law, the FDA required these distributed
materials to disclose the manufacturer as the source of the materials and
to indicate specifically that the FDA had not approved the information.52
The effect of these changes was to allow for the broader distribution of
research relevant to off-label use but not for the systematic collection of
this information.
An early legal challenge to the FDA’s regulatory efforts came in
Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney53 in 1998. The question to be
decided was whether the FDA was regulating speech or conduct, where
the latter was permissible but not the former.54 The trial judge responded
strongly; he interpreted the prohibition as regulating speech and enjoined
the FDA’s actions.55 However, on appeal, the injunction was vacated in
part, although it was unclear as to what then remained of the FDA’s
prohibitions.56 While direct marketing of off-label indications remained
prohibited, the door was now open for drug companies to disseminate
bona fide scientific information.
This regulatory ambivalence left drug manufacturers with uncertain
guidelines on how to promote off-label sales of their existing products.
Some companies created separate offices from their regular marketing
staff to provide information on off-label indications.57 In many cases, the
FDA found the adopted approaches inconsistent with FDA guidelines
and companies were subject to substantial penalties for off-label
marketing activities58:
50. Beck & Azari, supra note 33, at 103.
51. Id.
52. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa, 551 (2012);
Robert I. Field, The FDA’s New Guidance for Off-Label Promotion Is Only a Start, 33 HEALTH
CARE & L. 220, 249 (2008).
53. 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
54. Id. at 331.
55. Id. at 335.
56. Id. at 333–37.
57. Scott Whitcup, Chief Scientific Officer, Allergan, Inc., The Medicine, Law and Economics of
Botox (Feb. 5, 2015).
58. W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Regulating Ambiguous Risks: The Less than
Rational Regulation of Pharmaceuticals 6–7 (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Faculty Research Working
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The legal environment shifted again with the Caronia decision of
2012,59 which in turn rested on Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,60 a United
States Supreme Court decision from the year before.61 In the earlier
decision, the Court ruled by a six to three margin that “speech in aid of
pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression protected by the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”62 In reaching this
decision, the Court specifically rejected the dissenting position that this
form of speech “is inextricably related to a lawful governmental effort to
regulate commercial enterprise.”63 Critically, the Sorrell decision was
law when the Caronia matter reached the appellate court.
The case against Alfred Caronia was tried in 2009, years before the
Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell. Caronia had been convicted of the
misdemeanor of promoting the off-label use of one of his employer’s
pharmaceuticals and was subject to one year of probation, a fine of
twenty-five dollars together with one hundred hours of community
service.64 An interesting feature of the case is that it arose from a
government sting operation in which Caronia had been contacted by an
informant and asked specifically for information on the off-label uses of
a drug he was promoting. He complied with the request, and the
conviction followed.65
Caronia appealed his conviction, and in December 2012, a three judge
panel of the Second Circuit overturned his conviction. By a two to one
vote, the panel found “that the government cannot prosecute
pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representatives under the FDCA
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-005, 2015).
59. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
60. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2659.
63. Id. at 2673.
64. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 159, 160.
65. Michael A. Walsh, The First Amendment and the Emerging Tort of Off-Label “Promotion”
18–23 (Wash. Legal. Found.: Critical Legal Issues Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 183,
2013).
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for speech promoting the lawful, off-label use of an FDA-approved
drug.”66 Although the majority sought to limit the decision’s reach, the
dissenting judge warned otherwise. She observed that “the majority calls
into question the very foundations of our century-old system of drug
regulation.”67
The Caronia decision emphasized that “while the FDCA makes it a
crime to misbrand . . . a drug, the statute and its accompanying
regulations do not expressly prohibit or criminalize off-label
promotion.”68 Instead, this prohibition is an FDA enforcement practice
and not the law itself. Caronia’s conviction, the court emphasized, was
based on his “promoting and marketing the off-label use of . . . an FDAapproved drug,”69 and not directly of “misbranding.” In so doing, the
court sought “to avoid a serious constitutional question” of whether the
statute’s criminalization of misbranding was itself a violation of the First
Amendment.70
What the Caronia decision left unanswered was the evident conflict
between “prohibiting off-label promotion by a pharmaceutical
manufacturer while simultaneously allowing off-label use” of the
company’s products.71 It suggested, moreover, that “such barriers to
information about off-label use could inhibit, to the public’s detriment,
informed and intelligent treatment decisions.”72
Finally, the court drew the following conclusion:
If the government’s objective is to shepherd physicians to
prescribe drugs only on-label, criminalizing manufacturer
promotion of off-label use while permitting others to promote
such use to physicians is an indirect and questionably effective
means to achieve that goal. . . . Accordingly, the government’s
prohibition of off-label promotion by pharmaceutical
manufacturers “provides only . . . remote support for the
government’s purpose.”73
Not only did the court find that prohibition in question violated the First
Amendment, but that it also served little regulatory purpose.74 The
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Caronia, 703 F.3d at 169.
Id.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 167, 169.
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prosecution did not seek either an en banc review of the decision or an
appeal to a higher court.75
The Caronia decision was modified slightly in an appellate decision
in the United States v. Harkonen76 case filed the following year, in
2013.77 In that case, the defendant had issued a press release touting a
drug’s off-label use in language judged fraudulent even if not literally
false.78 Emphasizing that the First Amendment does not protect
fraudulent speech, the court upheld the conviction.79 In this case, the
prosecution skirted the issue of off-label marketing by emphasizing the
misleading means that were used.80 The decision thus avoided the
essential question of whether manufacturers are permitted to promote
through truthful means the off-label indications of their products.
More recently, a successor suit was filed in the Second Circuit, where
Caronia remains a valid precedent, seeking to enjoin the FDA from
enforcing its prohibition of the truthful promotion of off-label
indications.81 The FDA responded indignantly and argued that the suit
was “a frontal assault . . . on the framework of new drug approval that

75. Thomas M. Burton, FDA Won’t Appeal Free-Speech Marketing Decision, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
23,
2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324539304578260323575925896
[https://perma.cc/9YB6-XMRZ].
76. 510 F. App’x 633 (9th Cir. 2013).
77. Id.
78. The drug involved was Actimmune, which had been approved for two rare disorders
primarily affecting children. Harkonen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 4:12-cv-00629-CW, 2012 WL
6019571, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012), aff’d, 800 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2015). The company began
a Phase III trial of the drug for Idiopathic Pulmonary Fibrosis (IPF), a usually fatal lung disease
affecting adults. Id. The overall effects of the Phase III trial failed to show that the drug was
effective for treating IPF. Id. After the trial, the company conducted additional analyses not
originally part of the trial and found that the drug appeared to be effective in patients with mild to
moderate IPF—that is, the results in this group were statistically significantly different than in the
control group. Id. FDA staff told the company that this trial data would not be sufficient to gain
approval for Actimmune as a treatment for IPF and that further clinical testing would be required.
Id. On the day after receiving that advice, the company issued a press release stating “preliminary
data from its Phase III clinical trial of Actimmune® (Interferon gamma-1b) injection for the
treatment of idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (IPF), a debilitating and usually fatal disease for which
there are no effective treatment options, demonstrate a significant survival benefit in patients with
mild to moderate disease randomly assigned to Actimmune versus control treatment (p = 0.004)”
and also claimed the trial showed “a statistically significant survival benefit in patients with mild to
moderate IPF.” Id. at *4–5. The government complaint asserted that the press release falsely
portrayed the clinical trial as having established that the drug reduced mortality. Id. at *5.
79. Harkonen, 510 F. App’x at 636, 637.
80. Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee at 52–59, Harkonen, 510 F. App’x 633 (Nos. 11–10209, 11–
10242).
81. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 1:15-cv-03588-PAE, 2015 WL
4720039, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015).
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Congress created in 1962.”82 In doing so, the agency maintained that the
Caronia decision was limited to the facts of that particular case and did
not apply more broadly.83
The court disagreed and rejected the FDA’s position. It ruled that “the
First Amendment . . . holds protected, and outside the reach of the
FDCA’s misbranding provisions, off-label promotion . . . where it
wholly consists of truthful and non-misleading speech.”84 However, the
court found two limits to the Caronia ruling: “[f]irst the First
Amendment does not protect false or misleading commercial
speech. . . . [And] [s]econd, the First Amendment protects expression,
not conduct.”85
Until the Supreme Court has the opportunity to rule on these issues,
they remain in conflict. The Caronia decision is controlling precedent in
only the three states of the Second Circuit. In forty-seven states, the
FDA retains its authority to prohibit the marketing and promotion of offlabel indications. However, the agency is evidently concerned by the
prospect that the Supreme Court would limit its regulatory authority if
the question of off-label promotion ever came before it.86 While the
FDA can evade that decision for a while, it probably cannot do so
indefinitely.87 Suppose that the Supreme Court rules that the First
Amendment takes priority over the FDA’s regulatory authority, what
might we then expect of the current structure of pharmaceutical
regulation? We return to this question in our closing discussion of policy
judgments.88
IV.

THE ECONOMICS OF OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING

The widespread pattern of off-label prescribing follows directly from
the physician’s decision-making. A physician evaluating a specific
82. Id. at *35.
83. Id. at *17 n.34.
84. Id. at *52.
85. Id.
86. This is one interpretation of the decision not to appeal Caronia, discussed supra notes 74–75
and accompanying text.
87. In United States v. Vascular Solutions, Inc., the U.S. Attorney included the following
statement in his proposed jury instructions: “[i]t is also not a crime for a device company or its
representatives to give doctors wholly truthful and non-misleading information about the
unapproved use of a device.” Proposed Jury Instructions at 31, United States v. Vascular Sols., Inc.,
No. 5:14-cr-00926-RCL (W.D. Tex. filed Jan. 7, 2016). He cites both the Caronia and Amarin
Pharma decisions noted here for this statement even though they were decided in a different circuit.
Id. at n.26.
88. Infra notes 125–40 and accompanying text.
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patient must assess whether the benefits from a drug outweigh both its
direct costs and the potential complications and side effects for the
patient. The benefits, potential complications, and side effects will be
known only imprecisely, because even effective drugs may not work for
a specific patient and patients differ in their risk and susceptibility to
complications and side effects. Thus for a specific patient being treated,
the physician must assess the likely benefit and likely risk of
complications. For on-label use, the physician can assume that for the
average patient for whom the drug is indicated, the clinical trial data
indicated that the benefits would exceed their costs, or the drug would
not have been approved for that use. But where do physicians obtain
comparable information for off-label uses? Or, to put the question
another way, how do physicians make the decisions about risk and
benefit to inform their practice?
As noted earlier, there are two alternate routes toward gaining
information on a pharmaceutical’s attributes. What is apparent is that
both are relevant for physician decision-making and that prescribing
outcomes depend on more than the clinical trials required by the FDA.
While the previous discussion explored the physician’s prescribing
decisions, we now consider the decisions of drug manufacturers on
whether to sponsor additional clinical trials and then seek an sNDA for
an additional on-label indication. We consider the economic
implications of the FDA’s regulations in a setting where off-label sales
can be substantial.
For a drug with only a single indication, that question does not arise.
That indication is the subject of the firm’s NDA, which must be
approved before the product can be sold.89 Where the drug has a second
indication, however, the firm’s decision process is more nuanced. It
recognizes that unauthorized marketing entails legal risks and the
possibility of both large fines and legal judgments. Moreover, even if the
firm does not engage in unauthorized marketing efforts, there can be
strong prospects for making substantial off-label sales.
On the other side of the ledger, the manufacturer can decide to file an
sNDA specifically to gain approval for this second indication. Even
though Phase I clinical trials are not indication-specific and therefore
have already been carried out, this is not the case for Phase II and III
trials that relate to specific indications.90 And these additional trials can
be quite costly.

89. See supra Part I.
90. Id.
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A recent study surveyed out-of-pocket costs for investigational
compounds, which are of course heavily weighted to first indications. In
2013 dollars, these costs averaged $58.6 million for Phase II and $255.4
million for Phase III trials.91 In effect, these figures indicate the
prospective cost of securing marketing authorization for a second
indication. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that these trials will be
successful. Currently nearly forty-four percent of Phase II trials fail; and
even more than ten percent fail for Phase III trials.92 Investing in
additional clinical trials, as required to authorize a second indication, is
both costly and risky.
There is another issue as well. Even without benefit of on-label status,
many drugs still gain considerable standing with prescribing physicians,
which can lead to substantial sales. While those sales may be enhanced
by a successful set of clinical trials, they can also be dampened by
unsuccessful trials. If knowledge of unsuccessful trials becomes
widespread, there is even the possibility that current off-label sales
would decline substantially. Putting all these considerations together, we
would not be surprised to find little appetite among drug manufacturers
for securing additional approved indications.
These considerations can be summarized through the following
model, which describes the additional profits projected for a drug
manufacturer from engaging in the clinical trials required to secure a
second approved indication. Its expected profits from doing so are then:

 = 𝑝 (𝑆1) + (1 − 𝑝) (𝑆2) + (𝑋 − 𝐶)
In this equation,
 represents the greater profits from doing a second trial;
p is the probability of a successful second trial;
S1 is the increased sales from a successful second trial;
S2 is the reduced sales resulting from an unsuccessful second
trial;
X are the savings from avoiding liability for off-label marketing;
and
C represents the cost of the second trial.
This model assumes a given level of profits from current on-label and
91. Joseph A. DiMasi, Dir., Econ. Analysis, Tufts Ctr. for the Study of Drug Dev., Innovation in
the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs (Dec. 3, 2015) (on file with Washington
Law Review).
92. Id.
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off-label prescribing and also an anticipated level of risk from the
liability associated with off-label use. In this equation, we ignore any
costs associated with producing the product.
As anticipated, as the expected value of p increases, the firm finds it
increasingly beneficial to carry out the second trial. In the limit, when p
= 1, so that a successful test is assured, it is then profitable to undertake
the second trial so long as:

𝑆1  𝐶 − 𝑋
This expression indicates the critical importance for these decisions of
the level of C—the cost of the second trial—which can be quite high.
In addition to the marginal calculations facing the firm under current
FDA rules, there is a second relevant margin as well. This second
margin refers to an alternate policy regime under which current FDA
rules against off-label marketing are withdrawn. Consider the following
structure where there are four possible outcomes:
1. Under current rules, the manufacturer would have carried out a
successful second trial but does not do so when the requirements
are withdrawn;
2. Under current rules, the manufacturer would have carried out an
unsuccessful second trial but does not do so when the
requirements are withdrawn;
3. The manufacturer would not have carried out a second trial, but
had it done so, the trial would have been successful;
4. The manufacturer would not have carried out a second trial, but
had it done so, the trial would have been unsuccessful.
These four alternatives describe the alternate outcomes possible if the
current FDA rules are withdrawn. We consider the welfare implications
of each of them.
Cases 1 and 3 have similar implications for welfare calculations in
that only positive outcomes follow from the revised policy posture. In
Case 1, the market outcomes are the same as under the original FDA
rules, although without the costly trials, so their costs are saved. In Case
3, the trials are not carried out in any case, but now marketing the second
indication is permitted. Presumably, sales are increased and greater
health benefits achieved from the increased use of effective drugs.
Although the sources of the gains are different in the two cases, they are
both fully positive.
Case 2 offers a more uncertain outcome. Clinical trials, which would
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have been undertaken under current FDA rules but which would not
have been successful, are now foregone and their cost saved. However,
an inefficacious drug can now be promoted and its sales are increased as
a result. That case may represent the most idealized circumstances
supporting the existing rules. However, the net effect is uncertain
because the cost of the trials must be balanced against the health benefits
derived from limiting sales of an inefficacious product. The issue turns
on the relative size of the resulting health benefits as compared with the
costs of the trials.
In Case 4, the trials are not undertaken in any event so there are no
cost savings from dropping the current FDA rules. However, companies
are now permitted to promote inefficacious drugs leading presumably to
increased sales without commensurate health effects. Preventing the
marketing and promotion of such drugs is the ostensible purpose behind
the current FDA rules, and these are no longer operative. There are only
negative effects from eliminating the current FDA rules in this case.
Although the health outcomes of the four cases are reasonably
apparent, at least in general terms, what is unclear are the probabilities
associated with each alternative. Appraising the policy gains or losses
resulting from eliminating the current FDA rules requires a judgment of
the relative frequency of the four alternatives; but unfortunately there is
not sufficient information available to make that judgment.
V.

THE MEDICINE OF OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING

The medical rationale for off-label use seems clear. While clinical
trials estimate average effects, one of the hallmarks of drug therapies is
the heterogeneity of patient outcomes,93 which has been especially noted
in regard to psychotropics.94 Physicians need to tailor their choices of
therapy to the responsiveness of their patients. This factor is particularly
relevant where evidence from clinical trials is limited. For example,
children are often excluded from trials because the number of cases is
small and the gains to the drug company of having the drug licensed for
children are more limited. But observation and understanding of a drug’s
underlying mechanism of action can strongly suggest its extension to
treatment of children. Furthermore, there can be similar reasons to
93. See generally David J. Stewart & Razelle Kurzrock, Fool’s Gold, Lost Treasures, and the
Randomized Clinical Trial, 13 BMC CANCER 193 (2013).
94. See generally Stephen Z. Levine & Stefan Leucht, Treatment Response Heterogeneity in the
Predominant Negative Symptoms of Schizophrenia: Analysis of Amisulpride vs Placebo in Three
Clinical Trials, 156 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 107 (2014).
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extend a drug’s application beyond the conditions for which it is
indicated on the drug’s label.95
In prescribing drugs for off-label indications, physicians employ both
their own direct experience and that of other physicians as reported on a
case by case basis. Case reports are common in clinical journals, and
often serve to indicate what care is appropriate. The exploration of
clinical effectiveness for individual patients has received increased
attention as representing “N-of-1” trials, and there are available
guidelines for conducting and reporting these trials.96 If there is
sufficient interest in a potential use, a post-licensing clinical trial may
also be pursued, but this is not often necessary to establish an off-label
use as standard practice.
Moving beyond the experience of an individual physician’s practice
requires physicians to rely on case reports and trials of varying
sophistication and rigor as reported in the medical literature. Acceptable
off-label prescribing is often reflected in published drug compendia
offering recommendations on appropriate use,97 local or professional
society practice guidelines, and payer reimbursement policies which are
based on compendia, professional society recommendations, and
physicians’ own assessment of appropriateness.
There are many examples of how drugs have become widely used for
off-label indications through such means, and we discuss here two as
illustrative of the process.
Persistent pulmonary hypertension (PPHN) in the newborn is a
serious condition related to a failure in the normal transition in
circulation from low fetal pulmonary blood flow to a high pulmonary
flow as the lungs assume the function of exchanging oxygen and carbon
dioxide.98 The causes are diverse and untreated mortality is high.99
Inhaled nitrous oxide, which acts as a pulmonary vasodilating agent,
has emerged as the preferred standard treatment, although up to thirty
percent of patients do not respond to it.100 Viagra (sildenafil) is also a

95. Jeffrey L. Blumer, Off-Label Uses of Drugs in Children, 104 PEDIATRICS 598, 599 (1999).
96. See generally Larissa Shamseer et al., CONSORT Extension for Reporting N-of-1 Trials
(CENT) 2015: Explanation and Elaboration, 350 BMJ 1793 (2015); Sunita Vohra et al., CONSORT
Extension for Reporting N-of-1 Trials (CENT) 2015 Statement, 350 BMJ 1738 (2015).
97. See generally Brown, supra note 18.
98. Steven H. Abman et al., Pediatric Pulmonary Hypertension: Guidelines from the American
Heart Association and American Thoracic Society, 132 CIRCULATION 2037, 2038 (2015).
99. Id. at 2038–39.
100. J.N. Travadi & S.K. Patole, Phosphodiesterase Inhibitors for Persistent Pulmonary
Hypertension of the Newborn: A Review, 36 PEDIATRIC PULMONOLOGY 529, 529–35 (2003).
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vasodilating agent. In 1999, a case was reported in U.S. medical
literature of Viagra use to assist in the withdrawal of an infant from
inhaled nitrous oxide therapy.101 Following this report, several cases
described the successful use of Viagra in babies in Bangladesh and India
to treat pulmonary hypertension in children when standard therapy had
failed.102
There was considerable controversy regarding this therapy, including
charges that it might encourage unethical experimentation. A 2003
review article concluded that “recent studies have suggested a role for
specific phosphodiesterase (PDE) inhibitors in the management of
PPHN [and] Sildenafil [Viagra] appears the most promising of such
agents.”103 The review emphasized, however, the “need for randomizedcontrolled trials to determine the safety, efficacy, and long-term outcome
following treatment with sildenafil in PPHN.”104 Over the next four
years, additional case reports on the use of Viagra in the treatment of
neonatal pulmonary hypertension were published105 as well as reports of
animal models106 and a small-scale randomized trial107 with mixed
101. Andrew M. Atz & David L. Wessel, Sildenafil Ameliorates Effects of Inhaled Nitric Oxide
Withdrawal, 91 ANESTHESIOLOGY 307, 307–09 (1999).
102. See generally D. Abrams et al., Sildenafil as a Selective Pulmonary Vasodilator in
Childhood Primary Pulmonary Hypertension, 84 HEART E4 (2000); Sanjay Kumar, Indian Doctor
in Protest After Using Viagra to Save “Blue Babies,” 325 BMJ 181 (2002); James Oliver & David
J. Webb, Sildenafil for “Blue Babies”: Such Unlicensed Drug Use Might Be Justified as Last
Resort, 325 BMJ 1174 (2002).
103. Travadi & Patole, supra note 100, at 529.
104. Id.
105. See generally M. Chaudhari et al., Sildenafil in Neonatal Pulmonary Hypertension Due to
Impaired Alveolarisation and Plexiform Pulmonary Arteriopathy, 90 ARCHIVES DISEASE
CHILDHOOD: FETAL & NEONATAL ED. F527 (2005); Kam-lun Ellis Hon et al., Oral Sildenafil for
Treatment of Severe Pulmonary Hypertension in an Infant, 88 BIOLOGY NEONATE 109 (2005);
Robert L. Keller et al., Treatment of Rebound and Chronic Pulmonary Hypertension with Oral
Sildenafil in an Infant with Congenital Diaphragmatic Hernia, 5 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL CARE MED.
184 (2004); Astrid E. Lammers et al., Intravenous Sildenafil as an Effective Treatment of
Pulmonary Hypertensive Crises During Acute Intestinal Malabsorption, 16 CARDIOLOGY YOUNG
84 (2006); E. Garcia Martinez et al., Sildenafilo en el Tratamiento de la Hipertensión Pulmonar
[Sildenafil in the Treatment of Pulmonary Hypertension], 59 ANALES DE PEDIATRÍA 110, 110
(2003) (see abstract); J.A. McEniery et al., Infant Pertussis Deaths and the Management of
Cardiovascular Compromise, 40 J. PEDIATRIC CHILD HEALTH 230 (2004).
106. See generally Karen E. Binns-Loveman et al., Sildenafil and an Early Stage of Chronic
Hypoxia-Induced Pulmonary Hypertension in Newborn Piglets, 40 PEDIATRIC PULMONOLOGY 72
(2005); Yvonne A. Bremer et al., Sildenafil Citrate (Viagra) Induces Cardioprotective Effects After
Ischemia/Reperfusion Injury in Infant Rabbits, 57 PEDIATRIC RES. 22 (2005); Philippe Deruelle et
al., Pulmonary Vascular Effects of Nitric Oxide-cGMP Augmentation in a Model of Chronic
Pulmonary Hypertension in Fetal and Neonatal Sheep, 289 AM. J. PHYSIOLOGY: LUNG CELLULAR
& MOLECULAR PHYSIOLOGY, at L798 (2005); Philippe Deruelle et al., Effects of BAY 41–2272, a
Soluble Guanylate Cyclase Activator, on Pulmonary Vascular Reactivity in the Ovine Fetus, 289
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results. The use of Viagra to treat neonatal pulmonary hypertension is
increasing and becoming more established in clinical practice despite
calls for both clinical trials and the characterization of this treatment
modality as experimental.
The need for follow-up clinical trials for off-label practices, which
had been established originally through case reports and a growing
consensus among practitioners, is also illustrated by the case of
Aprotinin. That drug is approved “for prophylactic use to reduce
perioperative blood loss and the need for blood transfusion in patients
undergoing cardiopulmonary bypass in the course of coronary artery
bypass graft surgery who are at an increased risk for blood loss and
blood transfusion.”108 This drug became a standard treatment to reduce
the risk of bleeding for patients undergoing invasive cardiovascular
procedures even though it had not been subject to widespread testing. An
observational study, however, reported that use of Aprotinin was
associated with twice the risk of renal failure requiring dialysis.109 The
drug’s sales were suspended in May 2008, but sales resumed in Europe
in 2012 after the European Medicine Agency recommended the
suspension be lifted.110
These two cases illustrate several important themes in evaluating the
medical implications of the off-label drug use. First, as noted earlier, the
methods and assumptions of the clinical trials used initially to justify the
licensure of drugs, and those used to extend their uses to other
indications, are substantially different and have never been reconciled.
Moreover, we do not offer here a means to integrate these two kinds of
knowledge or understanding. This is the case despite the considerable
interest in developing methods for individualizing therapy based on
genetic, metabolic, or physiological markers.
Second, the case of Aprotinin illustrates that even where there is close
observation of individual cases, there remains a need for larger-scale
pooling and systematic review of the reported body of cases to fully
understand the off-label use of particular drugs. A commentary in the
AM. J. PHYSIOLOGY: LUNG CELLULAR & MOLECULAR PHYSIOLOGY, at L727 (2005).
107. See generally Christian Stocker et al., Intravenous Sildenafil and Inhaled Nitric Oxide: A
Randomised Trial in Infants After Cardiac Surgery, 29 INTENSIVE CARE MED. 1996 (2003).
108. TRASYFOL® (APROTININ INJECTION), FDA.GOV (2006), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
drugsatfda_docs/label/2006/020304s022lbl.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZT7-W8J3].
109. Dennis T. Mangano et al., The Risk Associated with Aprotinin in Cardiac Surgery, 354 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 353, 353 (2006).
110. Aprotinin Injection (marketed as Trasylol) Information, FDA.GOV (last updated May 14,
2008),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsand
Providers/ucm142720.htm [https://perma.cc/W7K5-4569].
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same issue in which the Aprotinin result was reported argued for the
development of improved statistical and epidemiological methods to
minimize the confounding of observational studies.111 Among the
approaches recommended was the use of propensity scoring and
collection of substantial number of covariates.112 The author noted the
need for obtaining results that can be treated with confidence and
distinguished them from methods that require a substantial number of
cases and substantial data on each case.113 A further statement in the
same issue called for more extensive Phase IV clinical trials—that is,
post-approval trials—to “be required before the indications for
pharmaceutical agents are expanded, particularly when increased doses
are required or administration in high-risk patients is proposed” and that
the FDA should encourage and support such trials.114
A commentary on published studies reported that the off-label use of
Misoprostol to induce labor had contributed to uterine rupture. It
concluded that “[t]he off-label use of drugs should be limited to
officially sanctioned, carefully controlled trials. Opportunistic off-label
drug use, with no mechanism to guarantee adequate evidence, again and
again has had tragic consequences for women and children.”115
Physicians and insurers seeking guidance on appropriate off-label use
have various sources of information beyond the pharmaceutical
companies, of which drug compendia are a major one. The Medicare
program, for example, restricts reimbursement for prescription drugs to
“medically accepted indications.”116 This is defined as on-label FDA-

111. See generally David Hunter, First, Gather the Data, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 329 (2006).
112. Hunter describes the propensity scoring in the following language:
For instance, the propensity-score approach estimates the probability that a person will be
given a prescription for a particular drug on the basis of his or her demographic, lifestyle, and
clinical characteristics; this score can then be used to control for potential confounding from
these characteristics. Another potential application of the score is to match patients who
received the study drug with control patients who did not but who have the same propensity
score; in essence, this is an attempt to replicate the process of randomization, in which other
unmeasured and potentially confounding characteristics are randomly distributed among those
who receive a drug and those who do not.
Id. at 330.
113. Id.
114. Gus J. Vlahakes, The Value of Phase 4 Clinical Testing, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 413, 414
(2006).
115. Marsden Wagner, Off-Label Use of Misoprostol in Obstetrics: A Cautionary Tale, 112
BJOG 266, 267 (2005).
116. See U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG
BENEFIT MANUAL: CHAPTER 6 – PART D DRUGS AND FORMULARY REQUIREMENTS § 10.6 (2010)
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/
downloads/chapter6.pdf [https://perma.cc/37W9-V6CV].
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approved use or use supported by one or more compendia identified by
statute.117 These compendia are the American Hospital Formulary
Service Drug Information (AHFS-DI), the United States PharmacopeiaDrug Information publication, and the DrugDEX Information System.
Other compendia also exist. Because the compendia are an authoritative
source of information on acceptable off-label uses, drug companies have
substantial interest in seeing their products included in them.
Compendia use similar methods for reviewing drugs and uses for
inclusion:
A team of researchers (who may be compendia employees)
reviews the literature for new clinical trials presented in papers,
meeting abstracts, guidelines, or review articles. The editorial
team evaluates sources of new data, ideally using an explicit and
uniform set of standards. A decision is made about whether to
include the new results in the updated chapter. Depending on the
particular compendium publisher, this decision may involve the
use of external consultants.
Once a draft is prepared, most compendium publishers ask
external reviewers (often consultants) to review the draft. The
editors subsequently decide how, and whether, to incorporate the
reviewers’ comments. A final draft is then prepared, approved,
and published.118
Despite their similar processes, compendia do not always reach
similar conclusions. There is extensive literature reporting conflicts in
the compendia across appropriate uses and flagging of issues such as
drug-drug interactions.119
The authors of a Duke white paper on this subject conclude that the
sources of information for assessing off-label use can be weak and the
potential for conflict of interest in the review of indications can be high,
with different compendia approaching the conflict of interest issue in a

117. Id.
118. MCKINNEY ET AL., supra note 20, at 27–28.
119. See generally Amy P. Abernethy et al., Systematic Review: Reliability of Compendia
Methods for Off-Label Oncology Indications, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 336 (2009); D. CondeEstevez et al., Potential Clinical Relevant Drug-Drug Interactions: Comparison Between Different
Compendia, Do We Have a Validated Method?, 26 ANNALS ONCOLOGY 1272 (2015); Božana S.
Nikolić & Maja S. Ilić, Assessment of the Consistency Among Three Drug Compendia in Listing
and Ranking of Drug-Drug Interactions, 13 BOSNIAN J. BASIC MED. SCI. 253 (2013); Richard P.
Paczynski et al., Quality of Evidence in Drug Compendia Supporting Off-Label Use of Typical and
Atypical Antipsychotic Medications, 24 INT’L J. RISK & SAFETY MED. 137 (2012); Renee Twombly,
Drug Compendia in Oncology: Are They Flawed?, 101 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1604 (2009).
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variety of ways.120 A 2014 assessment of compendia processes
concluded, “[a]lthough the compendia publishers and CMS are aware of
many of the current problems with the compendia and have attempted to
improve the system, much more can and should be done.”121
It is not clear how much guidance physicians seek on off-label use or
how rigorous their standards are for demonstrated effectiveness. A 2006
study by Radley found that among the twenty-one percent of drug
prescriptions for off-label use “most (73%) lacked evidence of clinical
efficacy, and less than one third (27%) were supported by strong
scientific evidence.”122
While the medical literature calls for expanded Phase IV trials, the
sources of funding for such trials are not clear. One of the important
lessons of current off-label use of drugs is that it limits the incentive for
drug manufacturers to sponsor extended clinical trials of their drugs.
Once a drug has been approved by the FDA, regardless of how narrow
the basis for its approval, physicians can extend its use.123 Prior to the
FDA Modernization Act of 1997, drug companies faced substantial
restrictions on distributing information on off-label use.124 This may
have created some incentive to formally sponsor trials. However, that
changed with the relaxation of restrictions contained in the 1997 law.
Finally, we observe that the companies who develop the
pharmaceuticals generally have considerable understanding of their
attributes. As a result, seeking to exclude them from the informationgathering process can be an important factor which limits the drugs’
effective use.
CONCLUSION
The FDA offers conflicting judgments on the off-label use of
approved pharmaceuticals. On the one hand, it is not dissuaded by the
Caronia decision, and considers it largely a hurdle to be overcome.
Since that decision is not binding in forty-seven states, the FDA still has
room to make its rulings operative, although its reliance on U.S.
attorneys and state attorneys general for its enforcement efforts may
have some restraining influence.
120. See generally MCKINNEY ET AL., supra note 20.
121. Lindsey Gabrielsen, Bias at the Gate?: The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Influence on the
Federally Approved Drug Compendia, 40 AM. J.L. & MED. 141, 163 (2014).
122. Radley et al., supra note 33, at 1023.
123. See supra Part II.
124. See supra Part II.
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On the other hand, the FDA’s own guidance advisories recognize the
medical importance of much off-label pharmaceutical use. The agency
states that “good medical practice . . . . [may] require that physicians use
legally available drugs, biologics and devices . . . for an indication not in
the approved labeling.”125 While the agency cautions the prescribing
physicians to base their use on “firm scientific rationale and on sound
medical evidence,” it further states that FDA permission for this use is
not required.126
In this pronouncement, the FDA’s inconsistency is apparent.
Although it suggests that off-label use should rest on strong medical
evidence, it then restricts an important source from which that
information can be gained. One reason for this contradiction could be
that the agency believes any information received from a product’s
manufacturer, unlike that offered by other parties, can be biased and
should not be trusted.
The agency’s skepticism that manufacturers provide balanced and full
information of the relevant evidence has some support. A 2011 review of
forty-one unsealed whistleblower complaints found a wide range of
unauthorized
marketing
mechanisms,
including
self-serving
presentations of the medical literature in three-quarters of the cases and
direct financial incentives for physicians in eighty-five percent of the
cases.127 While these observations are drawn from a limited sample of
cases in which the FDA pursued fraud complaints, they offer a context
for FDA concerns.
To an increasing extent, however, the FDA has lost its gate-keeping
function. As pharmaceuticals are increasingly paid for by third-party
payers, both private and public, the decisions of these parties on which
drugs to support increasingly determines prescribing outcomes.128
Unless payers are willing to authorize payment for particular drugs,
physicians are wary of prescribing them—regardless of being legally
permitted to do so. This leads to the question of whether payers will
regularly authorize payment for off-label indications.
This question was the subject of a recent court challenge in Layzer v.
125. “Off-Label” and Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices Information Sheet: Guidance for Institutional Review Boards and Clinical Investigators, FDA.GOV
(June
25,
2014),
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126486.htm
[https://perma.cc/K3QZ-QZLZ].
126. Id.
127. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Strategies and Practices in Off-Label Marketing of
Pharmaceuticals: A Retrospective Analysis of Whistleblower Complaints, 8 PLOS MED., Apr. 2011,
at 1, 1.
128. Shrank et al., supra note 21.
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Leavitt,129 which analyzed whether Medicare was obligated to pay for
medications used for off-label indications.130 By statute, Medicare is
obligated to cover drugs used for a “medically accepted indication” as
defined in certain compendia.131 In this case, the patient’s physician had
ordered a drug with recognized support in the medical literature,
although it was not for an approved indication included in the relevant
compendia.132 Observing that “FDA-approved uses often lag behind
knowledge of actual effective treatment,” the court dispensed with the
compendia requirement and effectively authorized coverage.133 The
court ruled that, consistent with FDA’s published advisories, “medically
accepted indications” can include off-label use.134
In a related case, the district court was again asked to decide on
Medicare’s coverage of non-label indications.135 It ruled the program
“does not cover ‘off-label’ . . . use that is not a ‘medically accepted
indication.’”136 However, it had previously limited the latter category to
drugs either approved under the FDCA or authorized for inclusion in
certain medical compendia.137 There remains ambiguity as to what
medical data is required for Medicare reimbursement.
Although the principal public payer’s reimbursement policies are
embodied in statute, this is not so for private payers.138 While guided by
the terms of their contractual obligations, they have greater room to
exercise judgment. They are also impacted by issues of cost and their
judgment as to whether the drug’s therapeutic value is worth its cost.
That judgment applies whether the relevant indication is on or off-label.
The critical missing feature in the FDA’s authority is cost. That factor
is not part of its authorizing mandate. As costs increase and as payers
rather than patients increasingly bear the costs of pharmaceutical
interventions, the distinction between on- and off-label use could lose
much of its significance. When payers rather than physicians or patients
determine which drugs are paid for and for which purposes, and where
129. 770 F. Supp. 2d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
130. Id. at 581.
131. Wagner, supra note 115.
132. Layzer, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 582.
133. Id. at 586.
134. Id.
135. United States ex rel. Fox RX, Inc. v. Omnicare, Inc., No. 1:11–cv–00962–WSD, 2012 WL
8020674 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2012).
136. Id. at *8.
137. Id. at *18–19.
138. Joshua Cohen et al., Off-Label Use Reimbursement, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 391, 391 (2009).
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these decisions depend strongly on the payers’ reading of the available
medical literature, then there is little reason for keeping drug
manufacturers from contributing to the ongoing debates. But this will
happen only when and if the Supreme Court applies the Caronia rule
generally throughout the country.
When patients paid for prescribed drugs out-of-pocket, as they did for
nearly ninety-six percent of pharmaceuticals purchased in 1960,139 then
the prescribing decisions of physicians were critical, and the FDA’s
control over the relevant information available to physicians was
controlling. However, as third-party payers have paid increasing
proportions of the drug bill, they have asserted greater control over
which drugs they will reimburse.140 How payers make their decisions is
still unclear, although it is reasonable to assume that insurers seek to
maximize the therapeutic gain from the pharmaceuticals prescribed their
subscribers for given levels of expenditures.
For payers, the distinction between on and off-label uses may become
increasingly unimportant as compared with their own evaluation of the
therapeutic gains resulting from the use of a pharmaceutical. In effect,
payers can apply their own evaluations as contrasted with those
embodied in the FDA’s NDA. While this shift has been ongoing, it
would likely be accelerated by a widespread acceptance of the Caronia
rule. In effect, that regulatory change may be occurring just as its
importance in the marketplace is declining. To the extent that payers
become the gatekeepers for appropriate off-label use, how they make
these decisions will be critical for patients and physicians. Specifically
of concern will be how they assess evidence on appropriate use, the
extent to which they rely upon the authoritative albeit flawed
compendia, and the extent to which they ask pharmaceutical companies
to provide additional information. The engagement of payers will
introduce another set of external actors to which pharmaceutical
companies will need to be responsive. That would be an ironic result of
the widespread adoption of the Caronia rule.

139. Patricia M. Danzon & Mark V. Pauly, Health Insurance and the Growth of Pharmaceutical
Expenditures, 45 J.L. & ECON. 587, 591 (2002).
140. Shrank et al., supra note 21.

